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Rights Discourse and Neonatal 
Euthanasia 
Carl E. Schneidert 
In the attempt to defend the principle that needs do make rights, it is 
possible to forget about the range of needs which cannot be specified as 
rights and to let them slip out of the language of politics. Rights lan-
guage offers a rich vernacular for the claims an individual may make on 
or against the collectivity, but it is relatively impoverished as a means of 
expressing individuals' needs for the collectivity. It can only express the 
human ideal of fraternity as mutual respect for rights, and it can ouly 
defend the claim to be treated with dignity in tenns of our common iden-
tity as rights-bearing creatures. . . . The administrative good conscience 
of our time seems to consist in respecting individuals' rights while 
demeaning them as persons. 
Michael Ignatieff1 
I 
Hard cases, they say, make bad law. Hard cases, we know, can also 
make revealing law. Hard cases identify the problems we have not found 
a way of solving. They reveal ways the law's goals conflict. They force 
us to articulate our assumptions and to examine our modes of discourse 
and reasoning. 
If there was ever a hard case for the law, it is the question of 
whether, how, and by whom it should be decided to allow newborn chil-
dren who are severely retarded mentally or severely damaged physically 
to die. For many years, the law has not had to confront that hard case. 
Recently, however, the issue of neonatal euthanasia has provoked intense 
public debate and intensifying legal conflict. Legal battles over the fates 
of several "Baby Does" have brought the question vividly before the pub-
lic. The Department of Health and Human Services has required states 
to incorporate neonatal euthanasia in their child-abuse statutes, 2 and has 
conditioned funds on a requirement that states institute systems to 
respond to reports of newly born infants being denied medical treat-
ment.3 The Supreme Court has, in Bowen v. American Hospital Associa-
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1970, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, 
University of Michigan. 
1. THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 13 (1985). 
2. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1987). 
3. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1987). 
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tion, 4 invalidated the latter regulation, primarily on the grounds that it 
exceeded the Department's authority under section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.5 Public concern has in fact been building for some 
time. Voluntary adult euthanasia was widely debated only a few years 
ago and public (and legal) attitudes toward it have grown more accom-
modating. Roe v. Wade 6 "dramatically changed the context of current 
debate about withholding treatment from anomalous newborns."' Medi-
cal advances have multiplied questions about treating defective 
newborns. These developments have made it easier for doctors to 
acknowledge the extent of neonatal euthanasia, thus further intensifying 
public concern. 
The public and legal controversy over neonatal euthanasia has con-
firmed what our understanding of hard cases would suggest: that both 
the law and the debate about it are awkward, anomalous, and confused. 
We see, as Professor Mnookin has noted, 8 a troubling disjunction 
between the law on the books, which seems to make neonatal euthanasia 
criminal, and the law in action, which does not punish it. Positions in 
the debate about neonatal euthanasia are anomalous in ways that 
bespeak our puzzlement. One might expect, for instance, that conserva-
tives, believing in the family's autonomy and the parent's authority, 
would want parents to make this decision as freely as they make other 
medical decisions. Yet many conservatives would use federal power 
(which they distrust) in the form of antidiscrimination statutes (which 
they dislike) through conditions on federal aid (which they detest) to 
intrude into areas of classic state government authority (which they 
revere). One might expect, for instance, that liberals, believing in the 
rights of the individual against the state, the autonomy (state-backed, if 
necessary) of children from their parents,9 and the rights of groups (like 
the handicapped) traditionally discriminated against, would favor affir-
mative action to protect those rights. Yet many liberals would leave 
these decisions to parents (with, perhaps, the aid of a committee of 
doctors). 10 
An increasingly notable feature of the debate over the law of neona-
tal euthanasia is that much of it embodies or responds to various 
"rights" modes of thought, particularly those modes based on "human" 
4. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). 
5. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1973). 
6. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
7. Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newborns, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 435, 436 
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). 
8. Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 667, 667-71. 
9. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 425 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 548, 625 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
10. Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, ATL. MoNTHLY, Jan. 1985, at 54. 
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and constitutional rights. This ought not surprise us: such modes of 
thought permeated American law generally. 11 Even the Burger Court 
has extended the regime of rights, if not by finding new rights, at least by 
finding fresh implications of old ones. 12 And in our intellectual and 
social life, rights thinking has achieved a currency unmatched in our his-
tory. Yet this potence comes at a time of growing social ambivalence 
about rights. There has arisen a sense, expressed by both the shrill and 
the sophisticated, that those modes of thought are testing the limits of 
their usefulness, or at least need to be tempered by other modes. 13 A 
development so multifaceted and momentous as this cannot readily be 
surveyed, much less evaluated. So in this Essay I wish to employ the 
problem of neonatal euthanasia to begin to explore the usefulness of 
thinking and talking about social issues in terms of rights, particularly 
constitutional rights. Neonatal euthanasia is suited to such an explora-
tion precisely because it is a hard case: it falls neither within the category 
of cases in which rights modes of thinking are clearly appropriate, nor 
within the category of cases to which rights modes are plainly 
inapplicable. 
II 
A. 
At the heart of our difficulty in approaching neonatal euthanasia lie 
the intractable questions it raises: What is human life? When is death 
preferable to life? What do parents owe their children? What does soci-
ety owe the suffering? Those moral questions could hardly be more per-
plexing, yet they are further complicated when they must be resolved not 
informally and case by case, but through generally applicable social 
rules. This is so for numerous reasons. For instance, the wide range of 
deeply held opinions about neonatal euthanasia makes rules hard to for-
mulate, and the wide range of factual situations in which questions of 
neonatal euthanasia arise makes rules hard to apply. It is, in other 
words, difficult, perhaps impossible, to write rules that will command 
general respect and work well for the entire spectrum of cases. This diffi-
culty presses us to take the problem of neonatal euthanasia outside the 
sphere of substantive social rules by seeking ways to make decisions 
about neonatal euthanasia which do not require social conclusions about 
11. See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985). 
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is the obvious, but hardly the only, example. See 
generally THE BURGER CoURT: THE CoUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
13. E.g., R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND CoMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 
1; R. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME (1984). 
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its underlying questions. Where there is pressure of this kind, the law 
generally, and family law particularly, seeks procedural devices that 
obviate the need for substantive rules. 14 For neonatal euthanasia, the 
nonsubstantive solution has commonly been to establish hospital com-
mittees to decide case by case whether neonatal euthanasia is appropri-
ate. 15 There is, however, an alternative nonsubstantive approach. That 
alternative is to define the issue in terms of rights. If parents, for exam-
ple, have a right to decide whether their children will receive medical 
treatment, the substantive issues will be theirs, not society's, to struggle 
with. 
A nonsubstantive social resolution of the problem of neonatal eutha-
nasia may be unsatisfactory to those who have specially clear and firm 
convictions about its substantive aspects, since nonsubstantive resolu-
tions rarely assure that a "correct" result will be reached. Such people 
may nevertheless be led to "rights" solutions, because such solutions 
often have substantive implications. For instance, according parents the 
right to decide may somewhat increase the lil<:elihood of euthanasia; 
attributing a right to life to infants may decrease it. Rights solutions also 
attract the committed because these solutions can greatly simplify the 
political battles that need to be fought: rights are the "trumps" of legal 
analysis, and rights solutions can often be easily implemented nationally 
and not just state by state. 
People are drawn to rights solutions to the issue of neonatal eutha-
nasia for yet other reasons. In particular, the debate is shaped by the fact 
that, when we think about a social problem, we in America today tend to 
think about it in terms of rights, a mode of thinking we find accessible, 
convenient, and comfortable. That tendency developed for reasons both 
too familiar and too complex to be reiterated here. It is specially marked 
in lawyers, since rights solutions arise readily from formal legal (espe-
cially constitutional) doctrine as administered by courts-a source which 
is basic in lawyers' training and which lawyers monopolize. 16 But rights-
thinking is not at all confined to lawyers. The civil rights movement, as 
the central moral enterprise of our time, has made rights solutions to 
social problems paradigmatic and has lent them powerful moral author-
ity in popular as well as legal thought. Partly in consequence, much of 
the social and legal thought of the last quarter of a century has been 
14. For a study of five such situations, see R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OP CHILDREN! 
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985). 
15. Many of those who have thought about the problem have advocated this solution, but 
because it is outside the scope of this Essay, I do not deal with it at length. 
16. It is not inevitable that lawyers should prefer rights solutions. During the New Deal, for 
instance, legal responses to social problems tended toward statutory and administrative solutions 
designed to furnish benefits rather than rights. 
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devoted to exploring and extending the doctrine of rightsP Thus it 
should not surprise us that rights solutions have appealed to both wings 
of the debate over neonatal euthanasia. To an examination of that appeal 
we now tum. 
B. 
Proponents of neonatal euthanasia can use the familiar constitu-
tional doctrine arising from Meyer v. Nebraska, 18 Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 19 and Parham v. J.R. 20 that parents have a "privacy" right to 
control decisions about their children's welfare in general and their chil-
dren's medical care in particular. This doctrine articulates a constitu-
tional right of great social and moral appeal that is buttressed by the 
practical realities that parents ordinarily make medical decisions for their 
children and that government is ill-situated to intervene. Furthermore, 
the doctrine is sustained by the popular feeling that parents have and 
ought to have such a legal right.21 Of course, this doctrine does not 
wholly liberate parents from governmental supervision: their decisions 
have been overridden where they have refused medical care for their chil-
dren on religious grounds, and their behavior is still criminal when it 
amounts to clear-cut child abuse. 22 But the parental-rights doctrine can 
plausibly be applied where nontreatment is arguably in the child's best 
interests. 
The doctrine of parental rights pervades the background of neonatal 
euthanasia discussions, though the argument for the doctrine is made 
with varying clarity and emphasis. Most starkly, Professor Goldstein 
would forbid the state to overturn parental medical decisions except 
where the medical procedure was "proven" and where "its denial would 
mean death for a child who would otherwise have an opportunity for 
either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy growth 
toward adulthood."23 Professor Goldstein believes that, "[o]utside of a 
17. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Utilitarianism and Natural Rights, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY, 181, 196-97 (1983). 
18. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
19. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
20. 442 u.s. 583 (1979). 
21. Cf. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die.· Who Decides? 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 401-02 
(1982); Robertson, Discretionary Non-Treatment of Defective Newborns, in GENETics AND THE LAW 
451 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). 
22. Indeed, it is worth recalling that despite the often-cited language of Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944}, see infra note 42, that case sustained the conviction of an aunt 
who violated child-labor laws by allowing her niece to sell Jehovah's Witnesses literature one 
evening on the streets. 
23. Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental 
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 651 (1977) (emphasis in original). Professor Goldstein writes, "The 
extent to which parental authority is protected by the Constitution is not of primary concern in this 
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narrow central core of agreement, 'a life worth living' and 'a life of rela-
tively normal healthy growth' are highly personal terms about which 
there is no societal consensus"24 and that "it must be left to the parents 
to decide, for example, whether their congenitally malformed newborn 
with an ascertainable neurologic deficiency and highly predictable mental 
retardation, should be provided with treatment which may avoid death, 
but which offers no chance of cure."25 Courts have applied the parental-
rights doctrine to a number of child-medical-care situations. In one life-
or-death case, for instance, the court said, "It is fundamental that paren-
tal autonomy is constitutionally protected .... Inherent in the preference 
for parental autonomy is a commitment to diverse lifestyles, including 
the right of pare~ts to raise their children as they think best."26 
Opponents of neonatal .euthanasia can likewise employ rights theo-
ries. Indeed, although they lack any single rights solution as powerful as 
the parental-rights doctrine, they can call on a striking array of conceiva-
ble rights responses, from the constitutional to the quasi-constitutional. 
For example, the Reagan administration, when it wished to restrict neo-
natal euthanasia, used section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,27 a 
provision which bars discrimination against the handicapped. Similarly, 
advocates for the retarded have urged that retardation be treated as a 
suspect classification, and, though the Supreme Court formally rejected 
that proposal in 1985, its treatment of the factual issue in the case seemed 
to signal an intention to require some enhanced level of scrutiny. 28 
Those advocates have also propounded a constitutional "right to treat-
ment" for the handicapped in state institutions. Opponents of abortion 
argue that the defective newborn and the fetus alike have a "right to 
Essay. Yet it should not go unrecognized that the Supreme Court has established that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects, as a liberty interest, the very nature offamily life." I d. at 646 n.5. 
24. !d. at 654. 
25. Id. at 655-56. 
26. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, I 56 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50-51 (1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 949 (1980). This case is discussed in the text at notes 96-98, infra. 
Because the Court was able to decide Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 106 S.Ct. 2101 
(1986), on statutory grounds, it did not need to determine the constitutional authority of parents to 
make neonatal euthanasia decisions. However, the Court's opinion made parental prerogatives 
central to its analysis and included a footnote which stated: 
The basic pattern of decisionmaking is well summarized in the 1983 report of the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research: 
"The paucity of directly relevant cases makes characterization of the law in this area 
somewhat problematic, but certain points stand out. First, there is a presumption, strong 
but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate decisionmakers for their infants. 
Traditional law concerning the family, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of 
privacy, protects a substantial range of discretion for parents." 
106 S. Ct. at 2113 n.13. 
27. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1973). 
28. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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life." Finally, the Court has often said that children have constitutional 
rights, although it has not defined the nature and scope of those rights. 
III 
A. 
I wish now to suggest that, despite its apparent attractions and evi-
dent currency, discussing neonatal euthanasia in the language of parental 
rights is awkward and inapt. I will identify three ways in which this is 
so. The first is that, when we in America think about rights, we tend to 
think in terms of the "Mill paradigm." That is, we think in terms of the 
state's regulation of a person's actions. In such conflicts, we are predis-
posed to favor the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy and 
human dignity. We have, to use a legal expression, a presumption in 
favor of a decision by the person. This presumption is tolerable partly 
because society can afford to bear the risk of an incorrect substantive 
decision better than a person can. The classic illustration of this comes 
from criminal law, where the accused is accorded due process rights 
because society can better bear the risk of a guilty person going free than 
an innocent person can bear the consequences of being convicted. This 
reasoning applies in other rights contexts as well. Thus the classic liberal 
position on voluntary euthanasia-that a person has a right, against the 
state, to decide for himself whether to live or die-is thought defensible 
partly because the consequences for the state of an incorrect decision 
may be unfortunate but are relatively slight, while the consequences for 
the person of being compelled to bear a life he would rather escape are 
onerous. 
In family law, however, the Mill paradigm often breaks down, 
because in family law conflicts are often not between a person and the 
state but between one person and another person. In these conflicts, we 
cannot be guided by our presumption in favor of the person: both con-
tenders have their claim to moral autonomy and human dignity; neither 
is a priori better situated than the other to bear the risk of improperly 
allocated authority. Our legal thinking about rights has conspicuously, if 
understandably, failed to develop a satisfactory alternative to the Mill 
paradigm with which to approach such confiicts.29 That failure is 
reflected in the painful awkwardness of the Supreme Court's treatment 
of, inter alia, statutes requiring a parent's consent to a minor child's 
29. For work toward such an alternative, see R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 
(1985); Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1756 (1981); Garvey, 
Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 
S. CAL. L. REV. 769 (1978). 
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abortion,30 statutes requiring a husband's consent to his wife's abortion,31 
statutes prohibiting abortion, 32 and claims that foster parents can acquire 
constitutional rights in other people's children.33 As we will see, the 
legal issues raised by neonatal euthanasia likewise exemplify the ways the 
Mill paradigm breaks down in family law. 
B. 
Thinking about neonatal euthanasia in terms of parental rights is 
awkward for a second reason: the origin, scope, justification, and pur-
pose of parental rights are all uncertain. That uncertainty begins in the 
absence of a constitutional text in which such a right is stated or from 
which it could be inferred. This kind of uncertainty, of course, is not 
unique in or to constitutional analysis. But in many other areas of con-
stitutional analysis, some kind of theory-usually some kind of political 
theory-is available as a guide either to the intent of the framers or to 
modern analysis. 34 In the area of personal rights, however, we lack and 
need, as Professor H.L.A. Hart has repeatedly argued, "a sufficiently 
detailed or adequately articulate theory showing the foundation for such 
rights and how they are related to other values which are pursued 
through government."35 We particularly lack a satisfactory theory of 
parental rights. Perhaps in consequence, neither the courts nor the com-
mentators explain satisfactorily why we accord parents rights over their 
children, and each of the three possible explanations is in important ways 
unhelpful in resolving the legal dilemmas of neonatal euthanasia. Let us 
briefly see how this is so. 
First, some of the holdings and language of courts seem to intimate 
that parents are accorded rights because that is best for the parents them-
selves.36 Seen this way, the parental right is analogous to the right to 
marry and to live the intimacies of married (or, to some uncertain extent, 
30. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
31. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). I analyze the "painful awkwardness" of the opinions in 
the Be//otti, Danforth, and Roe genres in Schneider, supra note 11. 
33. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
34. See Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N. Y.U. L. REv. 417 (1981). 
35. H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 195. 
36. " '[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the 
soeiety, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.' " 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for 
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 
18, 27 (1981) (fourteenth amendment proteets "a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her children' " (quoting Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651 (1972)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (fourteenth amendment liberty protects the 
"private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised"}; Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (fourteenth amendment liberty includes "the right of the individual to .•• 
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single) life as one choosesY On this view, parents have a right to con-
duct their relations with their children and to express their parental feel-
ings in the way they prefer. A right so based has, perhaps, some appeal 
in some circumstances, as when it prevents the state from ending a 
parental relationship without a hearing. 38 But, as that illustration sug-
gests, its appeal is substantial only in easy cases; only, that is, where the 
parent's interests and the child's are essentially the same and where the 
Mill paradigm thus essentially applies. But in cases which do not fit the 
Mill paradigm, and especially where parental choices determine whether 
the child lives or dies, the rationale collapses under the weight it is asked 
to bear, unless we are to believe that parents' interests regularly outweigh 
their children's basic well-being. This rationale for the parental right, in 
other words, too readily conflicts with the commitment to "the best 
interests of the child" that is central to American family law. It also 
conflicts with the second rationale for parental rights, to which we now 
tum. 
Some of the holdings and language of courts intimate that parents 
are accorded rights because that is best for their children.39 This ration-
ale assumes that parents will make better decisions about their children 
than the state because the parents know their child best, love him best, 
and can consult ideas-like religious beliefs or ethnic traditions-which 
are appropriate for individuals but illegitimate for the state. This ration-
ale, however, seems essentially prudential and therefore insecure: if we 
attribute rights to parents because doing so generally helps children, may 
we not, ought we not, deny parents rights in any class of situations in 
which attributing rights to parents would generally not help children? 
And is not the prudential rationale one which ill fits a situation like neo-
natal euthanasia, where the parents seem in many ways quite bad deci-
sionmakers? In the few traumatic days after the birth of a defective 
child, the parents cannot be said to know their child well, may not have 
begun to love (and may even have come to hate)40 their child, suffer 
establish a home and bring up children ... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). 
37. See Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 11 MICH. L. REv. 252, 288-93 
(1978). 
38. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
39. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has 
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("those who nurture [the child] and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations"). 
40. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. 
L. REv. 213, 256-57 (1975). 
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under harsh emotional and social pressures, have many interests which 
conflict with the child's, are thinking often for the first time about moral 
issues of the cruelest difficulty, and frequently know little about their 
child's condition and prognosis.41 Even this we could perhaps put aside, 
were the decision not one of life or death for the child. 
Third, some of the holdings and language of courts seem to intimate 
that parents are accorded rights because that is best for society. On this 
view, parental rights promote society's interest in what we loosely call 
"pluralism," that is, society's interest in social and ideological diversity. 
In some ways this seems to have been the value most expressly served by 
the Court's leading "parent's rights" decisions.42 Indeed, there is a sense 
in which the whole rights approach itself is an elaborately constructed 
means of promoting pluralism. Yet serving pluralism through parental 
rights is instinct with irony. First, decisions like Wisconsin v. Yoder 43 
broaden the range of choices available to adults by decreasing the range 
of choices available to their children. In Yoder, the Court held that 
Amish parents were constitutionally entitled to remove their children 
from school after eighth grade despite Wisconsin's truancy statute. The 
Court's decision served the interest in pluralism because it allowed 
Amish parents to live according to their own particular traditions and 
because it helped to perpetuate a heterodox community which other 
American adults might choose to join. But the Court's decision also dis-
served the interest in pluralism because it allowed Amish parents to 
"standardize"44 their children by removing them from the larger com-
41. The parents may know little for a number of reasons: the extent of some defects cannot be 
predicted at birth, experts often greatly disagree about the kind of lives defective infants wili lead, 
many physicians are iii-informed about the nature and treatment of severe birth defects, and some 
physicians have withheld information from parents. See, e.g., R. WEIR, SELECTIVE 
NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 59-
90 (1984); Hcntoff, supra note 10, at 61; Robertson, supra note 21, at 460. 
42. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("the 
Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all 
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns"); id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring) (''The 
Constitution cannot be interpreted ... to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us 
of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-
31 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty 
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
Although the holding in Prince does not serve the pluralism interest, Prince itself is most frequently 
quoted in a passage which does: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters . ... " 321 U.S. at 166. 
43. 406 u.s. 205 (1972) . 
44. Cf Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925): "The fundamental theory of 
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 
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munity and from the opportunities and choices which education through 
high school provides. 
The "pluralism" rationale for parental rights is ironic in a second 
way. Where the pluralism interest of the parents has been strongest-
where parents resist medical treatment for their children on specifically 
religious grounds-courts have readily found that the child's interest in 
physical health overrides the parents' interest in their religion, the child's 
interest in his soul, and society's interest in pluralism.45 To put the point 
somewhat differently, when the parent's pluralism interest is strong, the 
state's interest is often strong as well, and frequently for the same rea-
son-because the child's interests in the decision are also pressing. 
Quite apart from these ironies, the usefulness of the "pluralism" 
rationale for parental rights is clouded by our vagueness about plural-
ism's status in American law. Everyone likes pluralism, where pluralism 
means only some loose kind of cultural tolerance. But the role of plural-
ism in American law has-outside of the area of freedom of religion-
been strangely neglected in scholarly writing, and the sporadic cases 
arguably espousing pluralism have hardly enunciated any discernible sys-
tematic doctrine. For example, pluralism as it is ordinarily understood 
speaks to the protection of diverse groups, yet the pluralism of the courts 
seems often to protect ad hoc social diversity.46 If pluralism serves the 
former interest, it has little to do with parental decisions about neonatal . 
euthanasia, since few, if any, groups in American society make beliefs 
about that subject central to their way of life. If pluralism serves the 
latter interest, we are left uncertain just which kinds of "diversity" merit 
special protection. That uncertainty reflects another important con-
straint on the usefulness of the pluralism rationale for parental rights: we 
lack a sense of the limits of pluralism. Pluralism is not an absolute, and 
is perhaps not even a pre-eminent, value, since some common views 
about behavior and morals are necessary if society is to function at all, to 
say nothing of functioning well. And questions about when one human 
may end another's life are classically and properly central among the 
views about behavior and morals which society as a whole has been 
thought entitled, even obligated, to address. 
c. 
Thus far, I have argued that a rights approach to neonatal euthana-
sia is problematic because it relies on the inappropriate Mill paradigm 
and because the origin, scope, justification, and purpose of parental rights 
are uncertain. I want now to suggest that the rights approach is prob-
45. E.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). 
46. WISconsin v. Yoder is a notable exception. · 
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lematic in a third and final way. The problem has to do with the social 
and psychological consequences of treating issues like neonatal euthana-
sia in rights terms. It is hard to say to what extent the law should 
encourage people in their better impulses. Many of the law's attempts to 
do so-Prohibition comes to mind-have been moralistic in the narrow-
est sense and unsuccessful in the broadest sense. What, then, can the law 
reasonably ask of parents when deciding whether their severely impaired 
child should live? The difficulty of that question may be indicated by the 
rarity with which it is directly addressed. One begins, perhaps, by 
acknowledging that to ask parents to raise such a child is to ask them to 
suffer.47 One common response to that acknowledgement is that many 
parents have raised such a child, have found it rewarding, and have made 
it inspiring. Yet it seems callous to tell the parents of such a child to wait 
and they too will know the joys of difficult parenthood, and it seems 
presumptuous-and sometimes false-to tell them that eventually the 
joy will outweigh the pain. In any event, I doubt that we should suggest 
that the parents' decision ought to rest on the chances that they will, on 
balance and in the end, benefit by it: I would suppose that parents have a 
moral obligation to their children independent of any such calculation, 
and I would suppose that we want to encourage parents to make their 
decision as selflessly as possible. Yet this last supposition leads toward 
the disquieting position the court in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens 
maintained: 
It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an 
excuse for cpme it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how 
awful the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the judgment straight 
and the conduct pure. We are often compelled to set up standards we 
cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not our-
selves satisfy. 48 
My project in this Essay is not to say whether, or how far, we should 
set up such standards and rules for decisions about neonatal euthanasia. 
But I do suggest that, even if law ought not, or can not, encourage people 
in their better impulses, we should at least be aware of ways in which law 
seems to encourage people in their meaner impulses. I wish to raise, 
cautiously, the possibility that, as a matter of practical psychology, to 
frame the question of neonatal euthanasia in terms of parents' rights is to 
encourage parents to be "self-concerning." In one important sense, of 
course, rights are "other-concerning": rights are an acknowledgment by 
society that its members have claims against it. But by the same token, 
and I think more commonly in ordinary thinking, rights are claims by 
individuals against society, and are "self-concerning." Thinking in terms 
47. Robertson, supra note 40, at 256-59. 
48. 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884). 
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of rights encourages us to ask what we may do to free ourselves, not to 
bind ourselves. It encourages us to think about what constrains us from 
doing what we want, not what obligates us to do what we ought. Legal 
rights are tellingly different from moral rights in this respect: When phi-
losophers talk about rights, they commonly talk about a complex web of 
relationships and duties between individuals;49 when lawyers talk about 
rights, they commonly talk about areas of liberty to act without interfer-
ence. This difference is perhaps inevitable, since law's scope must be less 
than morality's, but this inevitability probably does not greatly affect the 
psychological consequences of the system of legal rights. 
It is of course true that the system of legal rights is not limitlessly 
self-concerning, for most rights find some kind of limit in a conflicting 
right. But in the context of our discussion, that limit is precisely the 
problem, for it is not restrictive enough. Rights not only conflict with 
rights, 
they conflict in the demands they make upon us with moral considera-
tions to which the concept of a right does not seem to apply at all: the 
requirement that we help someone in need, the generosity or kindness we 
ought to extend to persons simply out of love and affection for them 
50 
But rights discourse encourages us to think of the claims of others on us 
in terms of their legal rights; the danger is that it may thereby encourage 
us to feel those rights fully describe the limits of what we owe them. 
The self-concerning quality of the rights approach to neonatal 
euthanasia may be see in the extent to which it has become comfortable 
to weight the interests and even the ease of parents against the life of 
their child. This weighting of interests was perhaps foreshadowed in Roe 
v. Wade, where the Court seemed to found the very right to an abortion 
on the "detriments" suffered by a woman who could not have an abor-
tion. 51 Similarly, writing about neonatal euthanasia, one leading medical 
commentator won the approval of one leading legal commentator when 
he said: 
Families know their values, priorities and resources better than anyone 
else. . . . If they cannot cope adequately with the child and their other 
49. See, e.g., A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND PERSONS (1977). 
50. Jd. at 1. 
51. In describing those detriments, the Court wrote: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child 
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and 
otherwise, to care for it. ... [T]he additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed 
motherhood may be involved. 
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). It is significant that the most imaginative attempt to justify Roe is based 
on the fact that "our law does not require people to be Good Samaritans." Regan, Rewriting Roe v. 
Wade, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION 3 (C. Schneider & M. Vinovskis ed. 1980). 
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responsibilities and survive as a family, they may feel that the death 
option is a forced choice .... But that is not necessarily bad, and who 
knows of a better way. 52 
As a logical matter, of course, one may have a right without exercis-
ing it or feeling encouraged to use it. But I have been speculating about 
what we might call the socio-psychological consequences of the mode of 
rights discourse that prevails in the United States today. My sense, 
which is strong but not susceptible of ready proof, is that this mode has 
encouraged us to feel that "to demand our rights, to assert ourselves as 
the moral agents we are, is to be able to demand that we be dealt with as 
members of the community of human beings. This is what moral dignity 
involves ... .''53 The civil rights movement taught us the virtues of that 
attitude. But attitudes appropriate to civil rights may be inappropriate to 
privacy rights. Civil rights are rights to participate in self-government 
and society. Such participation is at least a virtue and may be a duty. 
But privacy rights are in a sense the opposite of civil rights-they are 
rights not to be affected by government and society-and to forego their 
use can be a virtue and even a duty. A person may, for example, have a 
privacy right to father more children than he can support, 54 but he pre-
sumably has a moral duty to refrain from exercising that right. 55 Yet as 
the law's rights discourse suffuses public discussion, such distinctions are 
easily obscured, lost in the fervor which attaches to the assertion of 
rights. 
IV 
One obvious response to the problems with the parental-rights 
approach to neonatal euthanasia has been to answer in kind by arguing 
that children or the handicapped have constitutional rights that offset 
such parental rights. Such a response has the attraction of seeming to 
put the risk of an erroneous decision on the parents (who stand to lose 
their happiness) instead of on the child (who stands to lose his life). I 
cannot in this Essay canvass the issues fully; my point, rather, is that 
here too a "rights" approach is awkward and inapt. 
First, a children's rights approach is problematic for one of the same 
reasons a parents' rights approach is-it does not fit the Mill paradigm. 
The Mill paradigm, we may recall, involves a person versus the state. 
However, when we use children's rights (or the handicapped's rights) in 
the neonatal situation, we have two people-the child and the parent-as 
52. Dr. Raymond Duff, quoted with approval in Goldstein, supra note 23, at 656. 
53. A. MELDEN, supra note 49, at 25. 
54. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
55. For an extended discussion of trends in the relationship between morals and rights in 
family law, see Schneider, supra note I I. 
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well as the state. We lack here, as we did with parents' rights 
approaches, criteria for choosing between the two sets of rights. We 
encounter a further difficulty as well. Insofar as the state tries to protect 
children from parents by strengthening children's rights, parents are 
inhibited from protecting children from the state by the traditional 
means-invoking parents' rights. 
Children's rights are incompatible with the Mill paradigm in 
another way. As Professor Sumner notes, "Rights theories have gener-
ally been formulated for the paradigm right-bearer-a competent adult 
human being. The existence of nonparadigm beings (children, infants, 
fetuses, the severely abnormal, nonhuman animals, perhaps also artificial 
intelligences) is awkward for such a theory."56 If we give people rights 
out of respect for their status as independent moral agents, it makes little 
sense to attribute rights to people who cannot be independent moral 
agents. This problem is particularly acute as to neonatal euthanasia, 
since severely retarded, newborn infants are patently incapable of making 
or articulating any kind of decision at all, and,· unlike other children, 
they will never develop fully the ability to do so. 
Children's rights, particularly in the context of neonatal euthanasia, 
differ from the Mill paradigm and from parental rights in yet another 
significant way. Parental rights are rights to make decisions unregulated 
by the state. But since children cannot make decisions for themselves, 
children's rights are commonly formulated in terms of some view of what' 
is good for children. In simple formulations, the right is a right "to life"; 
in the many grander formulations, the right is to the conditions neces-
sary to make life happy. Thus a crucial inaptness of rights discourse is 
that it simply leads us back to the substantive questions about the bene-
fits and costs, the wisdom or wickedness, of neonatal euthanasia. One 
attraction of a rights approach is that it seems to relieve society of these 
difficult questions and to transfer decisions to those most concerned. 
Where a rights approach serves neither function, its utility is markedly 
weakened. 
One way out of the dilemma of a right which must be defined in 
terms of the substantive questions about neonatal euthanasia might seem 
to be to establish not a right to a particular kind of result, but a right to a 
choice made on behalf of the child. However, if newborn children are to 
have rights of choice, someone must exercise them. That someone is 
ordinarily the parent, but in relation to neonatal euthanasia it is precisely 
the parent whose influence one attempts to check by assigning children 
rights. That someone cannot be the state, because privacy rights are pre-
cisely rights to be free of state supervention. A failure to understand that 
56. L. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 56 (1981). 
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fact about privacy rights creates the anomaly of cases like Bellotti v. 
Baird. 57 There the Court was so anxious to protect the child's right to 
have an abortion that it gave the right to decide whether she should have 
an abortion to the state, although the rationale of Roe v. Wade was that a 
woman should be able to decide whether to have an abortion free of gov-
ernment interference. Even if the anomaly of a privacy right exercised by 
the government could be overcome, it still would not be clear how that 
right should be exercised for the child. There is no way to know how any 
particular newborn child, much less a severely retarded child, would 
exercise his rights, 58 and thus one is again cast back to the basic substan-
tive questions about neonatal euthanasia. It is instructive and (from the 
perspective of advocates of rights for children and the handicapped) 
ironic that, when courts have attempted to think in terms of the rights of 
patients unable to speak for themselves, they have not uncommonly 
interpreted those rights as rights to die, not to live. 59 
v 
I have thus far undertaken to explain some of the factors that impair 
social and legal discussion of neonatal euthanasia. I have sought to do so 
by showing that one of the modes of discourse used in discussing neona-
ta) euthanasia-namely rights discourse-has been inapt and awkward in 
both of the major forms in which it has been employed. I will now argue 
that rights discourse has other defects that further impair its usefulness 
in considering neonatal euthanasia. I said earlier that the "liberal" posi-
tion on neonatal euthansia has generally been that parents have the right 
to decide whether their children will receive medical treatment, and that 
the "conservative" position has generally been that all children have a 
right to life. But I also said that each side's position abounds with anom-
alies. We can better understand those anomalies, and consequently the 
debate over neonatal euthanasia, by recognizing how genuine, numerous, 
and steep are the slippery slopes that complicate each rights-view. These 
57. 443 u.s. 622, 647-48 (1979). 
58. As Professor Robertson notes: 
The danger is judging the infant's situation from the perspective of normal adults who were 
suddenly deprived of their capacities, rather than from the perspective of one with no 
alternative but death. Even if a reasonable person facing irremediable pain or minimal 
participation in the affairs of life might find treatment harmful, we cannot be sure that one 
less well-endowed and experienced, would .... Curiously, proponents of non-treatment 
have not attempted to dispel the charge of egocentrism by asking defective children who 
have survived to adolescence or adulthood whether they find their lives worse than death, 
and whether they would have preferred non-treatment. 
Robertson, supra note 21, at 456. 
59. E.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a 
perceptive analysis of the problems that arise when courts try to exercise the "privacy" rights of 
patients unable to make decisions for themselves, see Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision-
Making, in PATERNALISM 153-70 {R. Sartorius ed. 1983). 
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slopes may work either to intensify a side's commitment to its rights view 
(by revealing ways in which such a commitment is necessary to protect 
other rights to which a side is committed), or to erode that commitment 
(by revealing ways in which that commitment conflicts with other rights 
the side espouses). But in either event a side's position is easily distorted 
by its efforts to cope with the surrounding slippery slopes. 
A. 
Liberals have been influenced in formulating and defending their 
position by several slippery slopes. The first such slope is the possibility 
that making neonatal euthanasia acceptable might legitimize involuntary 
euthanasia of adults. For at least a century, some liberals have advocated 
loosening legal constraints on euthanasia. But they have generally been 
careful-either out of conviction or strategy-to limit their arguments to 
voluntary euthanasia.60 Indeed, as Professor Burt notes, "A generation 
ago proposals for authorizing voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill 
adults were met, in part, by assertions that such practices would lead to 
euthanasia for defective newborns. Proponents of voluntary euthanasia 
rejected this argument, in effect, as implausible and wholly fanciful."61 
The practice of neonatal euthanasia brings us to the borderland of invol-
untary euthanasia and to many troubling questions about which other 
groups might be subject to it, with all the disturbing associations with 
"the elimination of the unfit" such questions carry. 62 All this makes it 
desirable to find handholds on the slope toward involuntary euthanasia. 
One such handhold has been the distinction between "active" and "pas-
sive" euthanasia: if euthanasia is confined to those who will die if not 
treated, some limits have been placed on the scope of involuntary eutha-
nasia. But the debate over neonatal euthanasia has strained that distinc-
tion too: its advocates have generally argued only for passive euthanasia 
(that is, death by nontreatment), but passive euthanasia can cause deaths 
so horrifying that active euthanasia begins to seem humane. 
This first slippery slope poses a variety of dilemmas for the liberal 
position on neonatal euthanasia. To those liberals who favor involuntary 
euthanasia, the slippery slope from neonatal euthanasia to involuntary 
euthanasia of adults should be troubling only tactically. But the tactical 
problem is not insubstantial. And to those-liberal or conservative-
who oppose involuntary euthanasia, that slope raises intractable ques-
tions about how neonatal euthanasia can be distinguished from other 
forms of involuntary euthanasia. Further, even if satisfactory logical dis-
60. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 
MlNN. L. R.Ev. 969, 1027 (1958). 
61. Burt, supra note 7, at 439 (footnote omitted). 
62. Kamisar, supra note 60, at 1031-33. 
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tinctions can be found, applying them must almost surely be difficult. 63 
Finally, there remains what might be characterized as a psychological 
aspect of slippery slopes: they work partly by domesticating one idea and 
thus making its nearest neighbor down the slope seem less extreme and 
unthinkable. In the context of neonatal euthanasia, this process sparks 
the fear that even an extension of euthanasia that is logically defensible 
will be psychologically brutalizing. As Professor Burt warns, 
When we find ourselves authorizing death for the deformed, we must also 
vicariously harden our hearts to the deformities we all feel, circumscrib-
ing the range of abnormality we are willing to accept in ourselves. As we 
do this to ourselves ... we are pushing along in barely perceptible steps 
the internal psychological processes which permit us one day rationally, 
coolly, bloodlessly, to consider what today seems wildly beyond 
possibility. 64 
The liberal's commitment to parental freedom to choose neonatal 
euthanasia is hardened by his second slippery slope. This slippery slope 
suggests that, to countenance doubts about the parents' right to choose 
neonatal euthanasia is to encourage doubts about women's right to 
choose abortion: If neonatal euthanasia is wrong or is a question for 
social, not private, decision, why is not abortion wrong, or a question for 
social decision? Given the centrality the right to an abortion has 
assumed in much liberal thinking, this slippery slope, by endangering 
that right, impels the liberal more adamantly to defend the parental right 
to choose neonatal euthanasia. Nor can this slippery slope be easily 
avoided. On the contrary, attempts to distinguish between the moral sta-
tus of the fetus and the new-born child have long been deeply perplex-
ing. 65 Roe v. Wade sought to create a handhold along the slippery slope 
by making viability the point at which the state may forbid abortions. 
The Court selected viability "because the fetus then presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."66 But what is 
"meaningful life"? What is the moral difference between a fetus which 
will soon begin to live a normal life and a severely retarded, severely 
handicapped newborn child who will never have one? If even severely 
defective newborn children are endowed with rights, can fetuses, logi-
cally and politically, be denied the same rights?67 The liberal's concern 
63. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
64. Burt, supra note 7, at 440. 
65. See generally L. SUMNER, supra note 56; M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 
(1983). 
66. 410 u.s. 113, 163 (1973). 
67. As one liberal journalist reports, 
To my knowledge, no organization of liberals or civil-rights groups has ever said a word 
about the rights of Baby Doe. Nor has any feminist group .... 
I have discovered, moreover, that most members of these groups do not take kindly to 
questions on the subject. Some liberals and feminists, for instance, have told me sharply 
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over these imponderable questions is exacerbated by the apparent vulner-
ability of Roe v. Wade: As a substantive due process case, Roe suffers 
from the stigma of Lochner; among substantive due process cases, it is 
one of the few that overrules a law that was neither anachronistic68 nor 
eccentric;69 and (partly because of those facts) it attracts as much polit-
ical loathing as any recent Supreme Court case. 
A third slippery slope pulls the liberal away from his position on 
neonatal euthanasia. This slope embodies the fear that to emphasize the 
parental right to choose neonatal euthanasia is to risk eroding children's 
rights and the rights of the retarded. The conflict between children's 
rights and parental rights has long bedeviled the liberal: while the two 
rights can usefully harmonize, 70 they can as easily clash. 71 Indeed, the 
Court has generally declined even to attempt to construct a doctrine of 
children's rights, largely because of the difficulty of working out the rela-
tion between the two sets of rights. 72 When the Court has occasionally 
accorded children rights, it has done so ad hoc and for reasons largely 
responsive to the particular considerations of each case. For example, 
the rights of daughters who wish to have an abortion without their par-
ents' consent may perhaps be best understood in terms of the Court's 
elaboration of the right to an abortion. Where children's rights have 
been most systematically developed-in juvenile justice-the state, not 
the family, is the entity with which the child is thought to be in conflict, 
there is an easily adapted standard (adult criminal-procedure rights) to 
consult, and the area is so circumscribed that a slippery slope into other 
kinds of children's rights is unlikely. 
The conflict between the rights of the retarded and of parents is less 
developed, since parents have generally spoken for the rights and welfare 
of their retarded children, but it has of late been emerging in complex 
and troubling ways. For example, in Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal v. Halderman, 73 reformers and parents of retarded children who 
wished to close an institution for retarded children found themselves 
opposed by parents of retarded children who wished to keep the institu-
tion open. Each side had some reason to claim that it spoke for the 
that if I were to look more closely at the kinds of people trying to save those Baby Does, I 
would understand that such rescue efforts are a way to make women subservient again to 
those who would tell them what they can and cannot do with their own bodies. 
Hentoff, supra note 10, at 56. 
68. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
69. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
70. As they seem to have in, for instance, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
71. E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
72. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
73. 451 u.s. 1 (1981). 
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rights of the retarded, and the only way to decide what those rights were 
seemed to be to return to "substantive" questions about what methods of 
care and treatment best serve the retarded. 74 
B. 
Conservatives too have their slippery slopes. The first slope runs 
from parental rights toward children's rights. That is, the more conserv-
atives defend their position on neonatal euthanasia in rights terms, the 
more they are led to defend rights (children's rights) which they view as 
subversive of the proper authority and rights of parents. This slippery 
slope, like some of the liberal slopes, is ancient: although conservatives 
have been enthusiasts for parental rights, 75 they have also been relative 
enthusiasts of state regulation of familial a:ffairs.76 Conservatives might 
argue that their slippery slope has a useful handhold by which they may 
prevent their preference for children's rights here from leading to chil-
dren's rights more generally. This handhold is the principle that the par-
ent's right of control ends at the child's (absolute?) right to life. Yet 
while this principle is consistent with the conservative position on abor-
tion, it is hardly a full statement of the ambivalent conservative position 
on the relations of the family and the state. 
The conservative's second slippery slope does not threaten his posi-
tion, but drives him to affinn it more resolutely. That slope expresses the 
fear that to allow neonatal euthanasia is to promote a distinction between 
people who are inherently worthwhile and those who are not. The con-
servative's perception of this slope is described in Professor Luker's fasci-
nating study of women active in the political controversy over abortion. 
She notes, "A considerable amount of social science research has sug-
gested, at least in the realm of medical treatment, that there is an increas-
ing tendency to judge people by their official (achieved) worth.'m She 
suggests that anti-abortion activists detest that distinction: 
To insist that the embryo is a baby because it is genetically human is to 
make a claim that it is both wrong and impossible to make distinctions 
between humans at all. Protecting the life of the embryo, which is by 
definition an entity whose social worth is all yet to come, means protect-
ing others who feel that they may be defined as having low social worth; 
74. See Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in R. MNOOKlN, supra note 14, at 265-363 (1985). 
Neonatal euthanasia itself has in fact put many liberals at odds with the ordinarily liberal 
"advocates" for the retarded. See, e.g., Biklen & Ferguson, In the Matter of Baby Jane Doe: Does 
Reagan Really Agree with Us?, Soc. PoL'Y, Summer 1984, at S. 
75. E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436,478 P.2d 
314 (1970) (relationship of parental rights and state sex-education program). 
76. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
77. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 207 (1983). 
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more broadly, it means protecting a legal view of personhood that 
emphatically rejects social worth criteria. 
For the majority of pro-life people we interviewed, the abortions 
they found most offensive were those of "damaged" embryos. This is 
because this category so clearly highlights the aforementioned concerns 
about social worth. 78 
171 
This slippery slope, as Professor Luker's reference to the abortion dispute 
suggests, in one sense corresponds to the liberal's slippery slope away 
from the right to an abortion. But in another, ironic, sense, this slippery 
slope, which confirms conservatives in their thinking about neonatal 
euthanasia, seems to lead toward principles liberals espouse: "Caring for 
defective newborns ... reinforces societal commitment to values of life, 
equality, and the non-allocation of rights by meritocratic or other dis-
criminatory [?] principles and thus. produces respect for the life and 
moral equality of all persons. "79 
c 
The ubiquity of the slippery slope problems surrounding the issue of 
neonatal euthanasia should not surprise us. Slippery slopes are likely 
whenever we wish to serve the interests of more than one person and 
whenever one person's good is complex; Dr. Johnson long ago reminded 
us that when we walk toward one blessing, we walk away from another. 
Slippery slopes develop when we try to secure both blessings at once. 
Slippery slopes also develop when a legal principle becomes so 
expansive that it threatens surrounding values or comes to encompass 
within itself conflicting values. Slippery slopes are thus likely conse-
quences of an adversary legal system in which lawyers are always 
encouraged always to press "[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself 
to the limits of its logic."80 And slippery slopes may be particularly 
likely when the "privacy" right is at stake, for that right has uncommon 
expansive potential. Some rights can be limited by consulting the words 
in which the right is stated. Thus a right of free speech seems linguisti-
cally confined to activities that have some plausible relation to speech. 81 
Some rights can be limited by consulting their purpose. The right to free 
speech, for instance, has sometimes been limited by an understanding 
that its purpose is to make a fully democratic society possible. But the 
privacy right is susceptible of neither limitation, because the Supreme 
Court has avoided stating what the privacy principle is, and neither 
78. /d. 
79. Robertson, supra note 21, at 458. 
80. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921). See Schauer, supra 
note 63, for an illuminating discussion of slippery slopes in the law. 
81. Even here, of course, the relationship of symbolic acts to speech has raised slippery slope 
problems. 
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courts nor commentators have convincingly articulated its purpose. 82 
Rather, the privacy right has been developed by a frankly analogic pro-
cess. 83 A principle developed by analogy need not be limitless; lawyers 
can be wonderfully adept at distinguishing cases. But "every fact leads 
to every other,"84 and analogy can build on analogy to lead who knows 
where. To cabin the right of privacy, the Supreme Court has relied not 
on some inherent characteristic of the right, but rather on balancing the 
right against state interests. However, since the privacy right and the 
state interest cannot be expressed in commensurable terms, that tech-
nique provides no secure or predictable limits. 85 These difficulties of 
delimiting the right of privacy are intensified by the way the Mill para-
digm encourages us to believe that the costs of extending the right will be 
distributed among all of society and by our appreciation of the liberating 
history of rights thinking:86 An apparently costless, historically benefi-
cial right is a concept prone to unreflective extension. But, as the break-
down of the Mill paradigm reminds us, extending the privacy right leads 
to situations in which serving one person's privacy right disserves 
another person's rights and interests and to the slippery slope problems 
such tensions produce. 
We may close this discussion of slippery slopes by noting that, from 
one perspective, they too indicate the inaptness of the rights discourse. 
The presence of difficult slippery slopes suggests the presence of conflict-
ing interests which are incommensurable. Such conflicts demand some 
kind of accommodation. But when interests are described as "rights," 
accommodation is impeded. Defining an interest as a right masks the 
nature and complexity of what is actually at stake; defining an interest as 
a right makes accommodation seem arbitrary, since we lack a hierarchy 
of rights to help us choose between them; and defining an interest as a 
right makes accommodation seem to be the breaching of a right or the 
defining away of a right and thus, a moral and political wrong. 
Fourteenth amendment jurisprudence tries to create such accommo-
dations by balancing the state interest against whatever private rights are 
asserted. But it is both a symptom and a cause of the rights mode of 
legal discourse that state-interest analysis is the least developed part of 
82. See Note, supra note 37, at 288-93, for a statement of the need for a limiting principle for 
the privacy right and a struggle to find one. 
83. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
84. O.W. HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 30 (1920). 
85. The flexibility of the technique cuts both ways, of course. Thus it has been argued that 
balancing ought not be used in first amendment cases because it permits excessive restrictions on the 
right to free speech. For an analysis of the use of state interests to limit the privacy right, see 
Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Privacy Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social 
Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1988). 
86. See W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 60 (1982). 
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fourteenth amendment law. In judicial opinions, that analysis is often 
perfunctory and pro forma. In scholarly commentary, it is often slighted 
in discussions of particular issues and regularly ignored as a separate 
topic of inquiry, especially compared to the cascade of attention given to 
questions about identifying and enforcing rights. 87 In sum, the slippery 
slopes I have described are a further indication that rights discourse, as it 
is presently practiced, lacks the resources that would equip it to be an 
effective vehicle for the resolution of a social issue like neonatal 
euthanasia. 
VI 
I have argued that rights discourse is, in its present form, an inapt 
means of discussing problems like neonatal euthanasia. In particular, 1 
have argued that there is no rights approach which does not appear (at 
least on this preliminary investigation) to suffer crippling drawbacks, 
drawbacks of which various slippery slopes are both a symptom and a 
cause. The significance of my argument, if such there be, lies in the 
doubts it expresses about a deeply ingrained, deeply useful mode of social 
and legal thought. Yet these doubts have their limits: they are directed 
toward rights discourse as we now know it, and rights discourse might 
eventually develop the kind of "satisfactory theory of basic human rights 
and their relationship to other values pursued through law"88 that would 
enhance its usefulness. Further, some of the inadequacies of rights dis-
course may be due to conflicts in social values which will some day be 
resolved. In any event, while my doubts about rights discourse may all 
be justified, I have not asked what alternative forms of social discussion 
would be preferable. 
This Essay, however, is not the place to propose an alternative to the 
rights mode of discussing neonatal euthanasia. Instead, I return to an 
observation I made at the beginning of this Essay. There I noted that the 
rights approach and the committee approach have in common the pur-
pose of avoiding social discussion of the substantive issues of neonatal 
euthanasia.89 Yet the rights approach serves that purpose poorly, for 
those issues persist even in discussions phrased in rights terms. To some 
extent, for instance, the jurisprudence of rights attempts to factor in sub-
stantive issues when it selects and defines the rights to be employed. 
Thus, we saw that questions of children's rights and of the handicapped's 
rights regularly devolve into questions about the substantive desirability 
87. For an attempt to remedy that neglect, see Schneider, supra note 85. 
88. H.L.A. HART, 1776 - 1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy, in EssAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 158 (1983). 
89. See supra Part II, Section A. 
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of neonatal euthanasia.90 Substantive considerations that are not fac-
tored into the definition of a right seek accommodation elsewhere. Yet 
we saw that the rights framework in which accommodation is sought is 
often unsuited to the purpose. In short, the substantive issues of neonatal 
euthanasia are neither effectively escaped nor well resolved by the rights 
approach. 
The committee approach to neonatal euthanasia, of course, relieves 
society as a whole of the debate over the substantive issues and leaves 
them to be thrashed out case by case by many discrete committees. Yet I 
believe it is a failure of both the rights approach and the committee 
approach that they seek to avoid a social debate of these issues. This 
belief is of course controversial and raises questions that themselves 
deserve an essay. Here let me say only that the issues involved in neona-
tal euthanasia seem to me matters in which society as a whole has an 
interest, which it may legitimately bring into public discourse, and for 
which it may, as in some measure it now does, legitimately try to set 
standards. 
Society as a whole has an interest not just in setting standards for 
the treatment of severely handicapped infants, but in helping both them 
and their parents. Politically, that help will most surely be provided if 
some sense of communal responsibility for impaired infants and their 
parents is widely felt. There is nothing logically inconsistent between 
such a sense of communal responsibility and the rights approach. 
Indeed, a community with a developed sense of mutual responsibility 
may gladly acknowledge a wide range of rights against itself. Yet it 
seems to me possible that, as a practical matter, the rights approach, 
when used too broadly, erodes such a sense of responsibility. A commu-
nity that attempts to unite itself largely in terms of the rights each citizen 
has against the whole has little to stimulate in each citizen concern for 
his fellows. 91 A community that relies too completely on rights thinking 
can too readily slip into viewing rights as stating the maximum as well as 
the minimum it owes to its citizens. Thus, I hope that an approach to 
neonatal euthanasia based on a sense that society has a legitimate interest 
in the issue might stimulate a sense that society has a duty to commit 
resources to what would be seen as a common problem. 
VII 
In closing so skeptical an Essay, I perhaps owe the reader some 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 & 74. 
91. For an argument that, as compared with Western Europe, the United States has a family 
law both much more oriented to rights and much less committed to assisting families, see M. 
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN 
CHALLENGES (1987). 
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clearer, more specific sense of how I would begin to confront, if not 
resolve, the practical dilemmas of neonatal euthanasia. Because of the 
difficulties I have described with the rights approach to neonatal eutha-
nasia, and because I share the skepticism of other commentators about 
"legalizing" these decisions by adopting the committee solution,92 I 
would hesitate to change the law on the books, despite its disjunction 
with the law in action. I would, at least temporarily, retain the law on 
the books while society, in the numerous ways available to it, debates the 
social and moral quandary neonatal euthanasia presents. I am drawn to 
this tentative conclusion because I see human life as an ultimate value; 
because I believe the helpless and deformed deserve compassion, not cal-
culation; and because I believe it would be degrading to live in a society 
which permitted children to die because they are burdensome. I concede 
that euthanasia is sometimes proper, though I believe such occasions are 
extraordinary and few. But like other commentators, I do not see how 
standards can be written which limit euthanasia to those few cases, 
which do not depersonalize questions of life and death, which do not 
dangerously diffuse responsibility for people's lives, which do not ask the 
state to endorse the principle that some lives are not worth living. Per-
haps these are very personal reasons, but they seem to me directed 
toward a question of legitimate public concern. 
I see this, then, as a matter involving important moral principles. 
Others see it as a matter involving important human rights. The danger 
of either view is that both moral principles and human rights are com-
monly felt to be, and to some extent ought to be, uncompromisable. But 
in a complex democracy, some compromise of both principles and rights, 
some decent respect for the opinions of others, some realization that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, are necessary. It seems to me a fault of 
the rights approach that it impedes compromise and even makes it odi-
ous. As I wrote above in a somewhat different context, rights discourse 
masks the nature and complexity of the interests actually at stake; turns 
the accommodation of interests into the breaching or defining away of a 
right, and thus a political and moral wrong; and, because of the absence 
of a hierarchy of rights, makes choices between interests harder. Fur-
ther, defining interests as rights inhibits compromise because the pull of 
surrounding slippery slopes makes a whole system of rights, and not just 
the question of neonatal euthanasia, seem to be at stake. On the other 
hand, a virtue of the present state of the law is that it may ease compro-
mise. First, as Professor Mnookin observes,93 the dichotomy between the 
law on the books and the law in action represents a compromise, a com-
92. E.g., Burt, supra note 7, at 441-43; Mnookin, supra note 8, at 682; Robertson, supra note 40 
at 264-65. 
93. Mnookin, supra note 8, at 667. 
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promise all the more attractive because unacknowledged. Second, the 
present law allows each state to regulate the problem in its own way. 
Since there are still important differences in social attitudes between 
many states, federalism seems to me to permit a useful, though neglected, 
form of compromise.94 
I said that my conclusion was hesitant. Whether the law responds 
adequately to a problem depends on the problem's scope, and we lack a 
clear sense of how common neonatal euthanasia actually is, or of how 
unbearable the lives of its victims actually were or were to be. I hesitate 
out of fear that cases like that of Phillip B. may be common. He is a 
Down's Syndrome child. His IQ is 57. He will someday be able to learn 
a job and to live semi-independently or perhaps even independently.95 
He can know "true love and strong feelings. "96 When he was twelve, he 
needed a heart operation to prevent his gradual suffocation. His parents, 
with whom he had never lived, refused to permit the operation, and the 
California courts refused to order it.97 Custody of Phillip has now been 
sought by and given to a couple who befriended him, and he has, belat-
edly but successfully, had the operation.98 If mere retardation, to say 
nothing of retardation so mild, is commonly cause for denying children 
medical care, I hope the law in action, at least, will change. 
94. For a more complete discussion of the desirability of social compromise over family law 
issues and of the difficulty of achieving compromise through rights discourse, see Schneider, supra 
note I 1. 
95. Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 419, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 788 (1983). 
96. Id. at 417, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 787. 
97. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979) (cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 
(1980). 
98. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at A12, col. 1. The lawyer for Phillip's new guardians believed 
that the case emphasizes that " 'institutionalized retarded children, like other children, are entitled 
to have their basic human needs met, including the need for love and emotional support; the need for 
educational and developmental guidance to help them enter society and the need for essential 
medical care.' " To Phillip's natural father, "the case represented an 'outrageous' intervention by 
the state 'in the rights of parents to make decisions concerning their children.' " /d. 
